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Abstract 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a subset of the public key 
cryptography. It is becoming popular in recent decades due to its highest 
security strength per bit, less memory requirement and low processing 
power. These advantages make it attractive to be applied in energy 
constrained applications such as contact-less smartcard system and 
portable cellular phone. 
In this project, a 173-bit (m = 173) Type II Optimal Normal Basis (ONBII) 
representation is chosen in the implementation of the Galois Field GF 
(2m) arithmetic logic unit over the projective coordinates system. An 
efficient Elliptic Curve Crypto-processor which is optimized for low 
power consumption is presented in this thesis. 
Firstly, the mathematical equations are simplified. Compared with 
the original one, the proposed expression can save 7.7% curve addition 
operations, which is the major operation in the algorithm. 
Secondly, the architecture of the finite field multiplier is modified to 
reduce the data transferred between the flip flops and logic elements. By 
using a 3-way parallel multiplier, the processor can maintain the speed 
performance while achieve the low power consumption. 
Furthermore, in the design of curve operations, the field operations 
are integrated into one single instruction. This effectively reduces the 
number of memory units which are used to store the temporary variables 
during the computation. 
The test chip was fabricated with a 0.35um CMOS technology. At 
i 
27°C and under a 3V supply voltage, this chip can operate at 18MHz and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to Elliptic Curve Crypto-processor 
Nowadays, contact-less smartcard systems play an important role in 
the market and are widely used in data communication such as 
electronic money, identification, etc. As many of these applications 
communicate through an insecure channel, the smart card 
manufacturers add the public key scheme in order to keep the data in 
secrete. The most well known public key algorithm is RSA and ECC 
(Elliptic Curve Cryptography). Although RSA is mature and widely used 
today, its long key length and huge computational requirement make it 
not suitable in the exponential growing market. However, the ECC 
proposed by Neal Koblitz [l] and \^ctor Miller [2] is more appropriate do 
this task. 
In this thesis, a hardware GF(2i73) Elliptic Curve Crypto-processor is 
proposed. This cryptosystem is implemented by using 173-bit type II 
Optimal Normal Basis (ONBII) representation. ONB was considered as 
the fastest hardware implementation method in ECC over polynomial 
basis representation and prime number representation. The basic 
operations in ONB are addition, squaring, multiplication, and inversion, 
all of which are simple in hardware implementation. The following 
chapters will describe how to improve the performance of the ECC 
processor in details. 
1 
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1.2 Aims 
Power saving is one of the most crucial criteria in the contact-less 
smart card systems. The objective of this research is to develop a low 
power public key crypto-processor which can be embedded into these 
systems. 
Power efficient architecture can be achieved by: 
> Using efficient public key cryptography algorithm like ECC. 
Since ECC provides the highest security bit per length and 
minimum computational and memory requirements among all 
the algorithms, its operating time is very short and thus the 
power consumption is small. 
> Suitable choosing of the power efficient design methodology like 
Optimal Normal Basis (ONB) representation. 
> Reducing the switching activities of the logic gates, since the 
power consumption is directly proportional to the switching 
activities of the logic gates. 
1.3 Contributions 
The proposed ECC processor has several features, and some of them 
even have not been presented by all the previous designs yet. They are' 
> Properly choosing the key size of the cryptosystem. Consider the 
trade-off between the security strength and power concern, this 
research uses 173-bit as the key length. First of all, 173 is a 
prime number and the fastest method to crack a 173-bit 
cryptosystem is the discrete logarithm problem, which is 
2 
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infeasible to crack in short time. Secondly, the security level is 
higher than 1024-bit RSA (a commercial standard using 
nowadays). And finally, as the Optimal Normal Basis (ONB) 
representation is employed in the design, we have to choose some 
specific numbers which can be represented by ONBII and the 
173-bit number is one of them. 
> The mathematical expressions of the elliptic curve addition have 
been modified. By doing this, one less multiplication is involved 
in every curve addition operation. 
> Combining the instructions of the finite field operations into one 
single instruction. This has effectively reduced the power 
consumption and the propagation delay. 
> The ECC processor was designed by using a 0.35um standard 
cell library. The interconnections between the logic gates were 
minimized by the layout tool "Silicon Ensemble”. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The idea of cryptography is introduced in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3，the number theory about finite field is presented. 
Some examples are given to explain the theory. 
Chapter 4 is an introduction to the elliptic curve theory. The 
relationship between the curve and cryptography is shown here. 
Chapter 5 describes the design methodology of this ECC processor, 
the implementation of the crypto-processor will be dissected part by part. 
Chapter 6 shows the specification, pin assignment and the 
3 
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communication protocol used in this integrated circuit. 
Chapter 7 shows the performance of this cryptosystem. The 
comparison between the new processor and the previous work also stated 
here. 
At last, Chapter 8 is the conclusion of this thesis and some of the 
recommendations of the future research are given. 
4 
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2.1 Introduction to Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of using mathematics to encrypt and 
decrypt data. It enables you to store secret information or transmit it 
across insecure media such as internet, so that it cannot be interpreted 
by anyone especially cryptanalysts. 
To avoid the cryptanalysts retrieve secret information easily, the 
security level of cryptography should be strong enough to against the 
attack. Time and resources required to recover the original information 
are essential indicators to measure the cryptosystem is strong or not. 
Moreover, properly choosing the cryptographic algorithm is also 
necessary. For example, Triple DES and RC5 are suitable in symmetric 
key encryption (secret key encryption), while ECC and RSA are suitable 
in asymmetric key encryption (public key encryption). 
A cryptographic algoritliin is a mathematical function used in the 
encryption and decryption process. It works in combination with a key to 
encrypt the plaintext, and the same plaintext encrypts to different cipher 
text with different keys. The security of encrypted data is entirely 
dependent on the strength of the algorithm chosen and the size of the 
key. 
In this chapter, two major classes of cryptosystems • secret key 
cryptography and public key cryptography are introduced. Then a brief 
overview of discrete logarithm problem is given. Finally, two major public 
5 
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key encryption standards, ECC and RSA are compared here. 
2.2 Public-key Cryptosystems 
Public key cryptosystems are based on mathematical functions 
about number theory. It involves the use of two separate keys, so we call 
it asymmetric. 
Public key algorithms rely on one key for encryption and a different 
but related key for decryption. There are two important characteristics in 
these algorithms. 
> It is computationally infeasible to determine the decryption key 
except when the cryptographic algorithm and the encryption key 
are known. 
> Either of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with 
the other is used for decryption. 
Public key cryptosystems can be classified into three main categories, 
they are: 
Encryption/Decryption" The sender encrypts a message with the 
recipient's public key. Figure 2.1 illustrates this application. Suppose 
Alice wants to send a secret message M to Bob through an insecure 
channel, she needs to encrypt the message. In the first step, Bob should 
generate public key pair (Kbpri, Kbpub), and gives his public key (Kbpub) to 
Alice. While Alice gets Bob's public key, she can use this key to encrypt 
her message, Kbpub (M), and send the ciphertext, C, to Bob safely. When 
Bob receives this ciphertext, he can use his private key, Kbpri, to decrypt 
6 
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the information and get the original plaintext, M. 
Alice B ^  
p i a h t e x t K e y pair 
Kbpri, Kbpub 
Original 
Encrypt by Plaintext，M 
B�b’s Public 4, =Kb—(C) 
key, Kbpub Insecure channel  
i L = � " " " "^  
k Decrypt by 
Ciphertext’ C ” Bob's Private 
=Kbpub (M) keyKbpH 
Figure 2.1. Encryption/decryption using public key cryptosystem 
Digital signature- The sender signs a message with its own private key. 
Signing is achieved by a cryptographic algorithm applied to the message 
or to a small block of data that is a function of the message. Figure 2.2 
illustrates this application. In this case, Alice prepares a message to Bob 
and encrypts it using her private key before transmitting it. Then Bob 
can decrypt the ciphertext using Alice's public key. Because the 
ciphertext is signed by Alice's private key, any other public keys cannot 
decrypt it except her public key, so we called this digital signature. 
7 
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Alice B ^  
^ Original 







=Kapri (M) Insecure channel  
Kapri 1 L —• Decryption 
二 ！ ^ Kapub (C) 
Key pair  
Kapri, Kapub 
Figure 2.2. Digital signature in public key cryptosystem 
Key exchange- Two sides cooperate to exchange a session key. Several 
different approaches are possible, involving the private key of one or both 
parties. Figure 2.3 illustrate this application. Suppose Alice and Bob 
want to encrypt/decrypt their message using symmetric key encryption， 
they need to get a session key first. Key exchange can let them get the 
session key safely through an insecure channel. At the beginning, Alice 
and Bob exchange their public key to the other, and using their private 
key to encrypt the other's public key, the keys generated by this method 
are identical, which is called session key. 
8 
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Alice Bob  
Private Key Private Key 
Kapri Kbpri 




Session key, * Session Key, 
Kapri (Kbpub) ^ Kbpri (Kapub) 
Figure 2.3. Key exchange in public key cryptosystem 
2.3 Secret-key Cryptosystems 
Secret key cryptosystems also called symmetric key cryptosystems. 
It was because the keys used in encryption and decryption are the same. 
E (M) = C 
D (C) = M 
D (E (m))=M 
Where E ( ) for encryption function, D ( ) for decryption function, M is 
plaintext and C is ciphertext. 
2.4 Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is fundamental to a number of 
public key algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the 
digital signature algorithm. There are some efficient algorithms that can 
9 
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efficiently reduce the DLP in the group. They are-
> Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [1] 
> Pollard's p method [2] 
> Index-calculus methods [3] 
Consider the following equation: 
y^g"" mod n 
Where g，x, n are the elements in the group. 
Calculate y by given g, x, n is straightforward. However, given y, g, n, 
it is very difficult to calculate x，which is the discrete logarithm problem. 
For example in elliptic curve DLP, Pollard's p method has an expected 
running time of ylm/2 elliptic curve operations, which is the best 
general purpose algorithm known. 
2.5 Comparison between ECC and RSA 
In the public key cryptosystems, there are two main encryption 
algorithm, they are RSA and ECC. 
RSA was published by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman at 
MIT in 1978 [4]. This algorithm is a block cipher in which the plaintext 
and ciphertext are integers between 0 and n - 1 for some n. In the 
generation of the key pair, it involves two prime numbers, which is 
sufficiently large to prevent the discovery of the keys by exhaustive 
search method. Nowadays, the commercial systems use 1024-bit RSA for 
encryption applications. 
ECC was proposed by Neal KobHtz [6] and Victor Miller [7] in 1985. 
This algorithm based on the "addition" properties of the elliptic curve. 
10 
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Details of the elliptic curve will be introduced in Chapter 4. The key size 
used in ECC is much shorter than RSA with approximately the same 
security level. The amount of work required to solve 128-bit ECC was 
about fifty times that required to solve the 512-bit RSA. Therefore, ECC 
will become popular in public key cryptosystems. 
C O M P A R I S O N O F S E C U R I T Y L E V E L S 
〜 八 " E C C a n d R S A 
6 0 0 0 -|  
5000 - > 
1 4000 -
碧 3000 - jT 
2 2000 -
1 0 0 0 - • — 
0 T 1 I  
沪 嫁 ^ ^ ^  
-^ECC 
T i m e t o B r e a k K e y ( M I P S Y e a r s ) | — r s a & d s a 
Figure 2.4. Comparison of security levels 
(Source from www.certicom.com) 
Figure 2.4 shown above is the security strength of ECC and RSA 
against the time to break. In the graph, we can see that ECC has a 
potential to replace RSA in the coming future due to its high security 
s tren^h per bit. Table 2.1 and Figure 2.5 show the time used for 
different applications of ECC and RSA. The overall performance of ECC 
is better than RSA due to its shorter key length, especially in the key 
generation. In the conclusion, RSA is a mature algorithm and commonly 
11 
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used in the commercial systems. However, ECC is a new mathematical 
algorithm, which has a large improvement in the research area. 
API Function ECC Engine RSA Engine 
(163 bits) (1024 bits) 
Key generation, 3.19 681.63 
EnciypUis 9.72 2.09 = 
Decrypt’ ms 16.36 31.64 
s S t m s 3 1 . 5 4 
I  I  i 
Verify, ms 8.33 2.06 ] 
Table 2.1. Comparison between the applications of ECC and RSA 
ECC vs RSA 
Time 
(ms) — — 
keygen. encrypt. de_. sign. ^^ fy 。二 
�Ct： 
山 
Figure 2.5. The plot of the applications of ECC and RSA 
12 
Chapter 2 Cryptography 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has given an introduction about the topics of 
cryptography, the different between symmetric and asymmetric key 
cryptography, the applications of the public key cryptography, and the 
discrete logarithm problem about the cryptography. At last, the 
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Number Systems 
3.1 Introduction to Number Systems 
Elliptic curve mathematics is based on abstract algebra in particular 
finite fields. In this chapter, some basic concepts of Groups, Rings and 
Fields are introduced. Then follow with the modular arithmetic used in 
Finite Fields. Finally, the arithmetic operations in the optimal normal 
basis mathematics are discussed in details. 
3.2 Groups, Rings and Fields 
Group theory is concerned with systems in which always have a 
unique solution. It requires only that a mathematical system obey a few 
simple rules. The theory then seeks to find out properties common to all 
systems that obey these few rules. 
The axioms for a group are-
> Closure- If a and b are in the group then a • b is also in the 
group. 
> Associativity- If a, b and c are in the group then 
• (a • b) • c = a • (b • c). 
> Identity: There is an element e of the group such that for any 
element a of the group a • e = e • a = a. 
> Inverse: For any element a of the group there is an element a i 
such that 
14 
Chapter 3 Mathematical Background in Number Systems 
• a • a.i = e，and 
• a-i • a = e 
The theory does not concern itself with what a and b actually are nor 
with what the operation symbolized by “ • “ actually is. For example, if 
the group operation is replaced by multiplication “X”，then the group is 
said to be multiplicative group. 
The group is called abelian if the operation is commutative, i.e. 
a • b = b • a 
A ring (R，+’x) consists of a set R, addition operation “+”，and 
multiplication operation “X” on R. 
The axioms of a ring are: 
> (R,+’x，0) is and abelian group. 
> The operation x is associative, i.e. (a x b) x c = a x (b x c). 
> There exists an identity 1 such that l x a = a x l = a. 
> The operation x is distributive over +. i.e. 
• a X (b + c) = (a X b) + (a X c) 
• (b + c) X a = (b X a) + (c X a) 
Af ie ld is a commutative ring in which every non-zero element has a 
multiplicative inverse, i.e. a.i x a = a x a ! = 1 for a 0. 
3.3 Finite Fields 
A finite field is a field which contains a finite number of elements 
with several properties: 
15 
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> Every element in the finite field has an inverse. 
> The finite field contains an additive identity element in the rules 
of addition. 
> The finite field contains a multiplicative identity element in the 
rules of multiplication. 
3.4 Modular Arithmetic 
In integer field, if b is any integer and n is a positive integer, we 
write b mod n for the remainder in {O,…，n-1} that occurs if b is divided 
by n. Suppose a is a integer in {0，…’ n-l}，we call a, b congruent modulo n, 
written as a = b (mod n) if and only if one of the following equivalent 
conditions holds: 
> their difference is divisible by n. 
> they leave the same remainder when divided by n. 
> a - b = kn for some integer k. 
> a - b in the ideal of all integers divisible by n. 
3.5 Optimal Normal Basis 
optimal normal basis were considered the fastest implementation 
method in the elliptic curve cryptosystems. Only AND, XOR and rotation 
operations are needed, which are very efficient in hardware. In the 
following sub-sections, the theory of normal basis mathematics will be 
described first, and then discuss the theory behind the normal basis 
multiplication and inversion. 
16 
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3.5.1 What is a Normal Basis? 
A normal basis representation can be described with algebraic 
polynomials. Suppose p is an element in the field Fp"^ , the polynomial 
representation is-
P - ++ + a^ 
Where n < m. 
A normal basis can be formed using the set: 
\p,-、,.",pp\pp,p\ 
For the ease of hardware implementation, we always use characteristic 2 
in the finite field, (i.e. set p = 2,卩2爪). 




The addition in finite field is simple, different from the addition over 
real number field, only involve XOR logic, no carry path is needed in the 
operation. 
17 









Squaring is the special case of multiplication. It only involves 
rotating one bit from least significant bit to most significant bit. 
There are two reasons for this-
> 
• Proof： (/?2')2=�2(2'):�2'+, 
> 
• Proof： p"-" =/?''"fmod = . 
V P J 
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3.5.4 Multiplication 
Multiplication over is defined as follows. 
For 





by rearranging this term: 
k=0 k=0 
where Aijk is called the 'lambda matrix", and 
m-l m-1 
Ck = 2 ] Z “ / M 讲 
1=0 y=o 
The mathematicians proved that the above equation can be further 
simplified to: 
w-l w-1 
Ck = • + � . + • 
1=0 y=o 
3.5.5 Optimal Normal Basis 
The lambda matrix described in the previous sections is a m x m 
multiplication table. The more the zero terms in the table, the more the 
efficient of the multiplier. We called it an "Optimal Normal Basis (ONB)" 
if it has the minimum number of nonzero terms. 
There are two types of optimal normal basis over They are called 
TVpe I ONB and Type II ONB. Different types of ONB have different 
19 
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rules, as shown in follows. 
> Type I Optimal Normal Basis over 卩2爪 
• m + 1 must be prime. 
• 2 must be primitive in Zm+i. 
> lype II Optimal Normal Basis over FV" 
• 2m + 1 is prime 
• and either two of the following 
• 2 is primitive in Z2m+i. 
• 2m + 1 = 3 mod 4 and 2 generates the quadratic 
residues in Z2m+i. 
where Zm is a set of integers in the range 1 ... m. 
Although the theory behind ONB seems very difficult, the 
generation of the lambda matrix is petty easy. Next section will show you 
an example on how to generate this matrix over 
3.5.6 Generation of the Lambda Matrix 
Suppose using the field with m = 4 in ONB representation. 
F24 is a l ype I ONB because, 
> 4 + 1 = 5 is prime 
> 2 is primitive in Z5. 
Then define the irreducible polynomial for i.e. 
/ ( 1 ) = ? + ? +义 2 + 1 + 1 
and setup the polynomial for normal basis of F24 over F2. 
( 2 22 2, 
X 9 X J X 
20 
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Next, construct a 4x4 matrix A as follows: 
RowO: X mod / (x ) = 0 - x ^ = (O 0 1 0) 
Row 1:义2 mod / (x ) = 0-x'+l-jc^+0-;c'+0-x°=(0 1 0 0) 
Row 2: mod = 1 1 1) 
Row 3： X® mod f{x) = \-x'+0-x^+0-x'+0-x'={\ 0 0 0) 
' 0 0 1 0 ' 
0 1 0 0 
A = 
1 1 1 1 
ll 0 0 
FindA-i’ 
'0 0 0 r 
, 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
. 1 1 1 1 . 
Construct another 4x4 matrix T^  as follows: 
RowO: x-x mod / W = 0-;c^ + l - x ' + 0 - x ' + 0 - x ° = (0 1 0 0) 
Row 1： A：-? mod f{x) = \'x'+0-x^+0-x'+0-x'=(\ 0 0 0) 
Row 2: mod /(;c) = 0 - x ' + 0 - x ' = ( 0 0 0 1) 
Row 3： mod f{x) = \-x' + \-x^+\-x'+\-x'={l 1 1 1) 
' 0 1 0 0 ' 
, 1 0 0 0 
T'= 
0 0 0 1 
and calculate, T = T t x A i 
'0 1 0 oWo 0 0 iWo 1 0 0' 
— 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 一 0 0 0 1 
" 0 0 0 1 ^ 1 0 0 0 ~ 1 1 1 1 
�1 1 1 iJLi 1 1 ij i o � 1 0, 
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The lambda matrix can be found by-
'r(o’o) r(3，3) r(2,2) r ( i ’ i ) ) � 0 0 1 0 � 
义一 r(i，o) r(o，3) r(3’2) r(2’i) _ 0 0 1 1 
_ r(2,o) r(i,3) r(o，2) r(3,i) 一 1 1 0 0 
,r(3,o) r(2,3) r(i,2) r(o,i)J [o 1 0 
Actually, this lambda matrix is a table used for wiring the circuit like 
that, suppose j，{“。，口”“?，*^〕}’^  = fe)A，办2，M and C = {cq,c^,C2,c^} 
bo t\ 办3 
0 1 0 ' 
a, 0 0 1 1 
a^ 1 1 0 0 
iZjI^O 1 0 
Co = ajb^ � fl丨(62 ® 办3) ® fe) ® 办1) ® fe �办3 ) 
c, =a丨63 ㊉ “ 2 ( 6 3 ④ 6 o )㊉ “ 3 ( 6 1 ④ >^2)㊉flofe 
C2 = ajb^ e � 6丨 ) � “0 fe �办3) ® fe ® ) 
C3 =“36 丨㊉�0(6丨④� 2)® … f e® � 
The example shown above is the method used to generate the ONB 
multiplication table. This matrix only give the information in the 
connection between the input A, input B and the output C, which can be 
done using Matlab simulation. 
3.5.7 Inversion 
Suppose a is an element over the inversion of a is denoted by a"i 
and defined as: 
axa~^  =1 
By Fermat's Theorem [5]-
/ 2'"-'-l V 
a =a = f 
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If m is odd, 
By considering the exponent, it can be factorized to: 
2-1 一i = (2("丨•一 i)(2('"-i)'2+1) 
. . . 广 丨 “ 寺 • + � ） Eq. 3.1 
Recursively decompose term until m = 2 (i.e. a ^ ^ = a ) , the 
algorithm can be solved. In this case, we only need to compute a^^"丨丨‘+丨， 
and computing this term is easy, just rotate it by (m-l)/2 bit to left. 
It is little complicated when m is even, the exponent can be 
factorized to: 
_ 1 = 2(2("'-I)" - + 1 ) + 1 
substitute it back to a, the equation will become: 
〜1)广口 Eq. 3.2 
this means, an extra multiplication and shifting operations are needed to 
compute the result. 
Since this research is to implement a 173-bit Elliptic Curve 
Crypto-processor, let's pick m = 173 as an example to describe this 
inversion algorithm in practice. 
Since 
1 _ 2'"-2 a = a 
«2'”-2 = “2.(28M)(286+i) apply Eq. 3.1 ... 173 is odd 
“2--丨=“(2«-丨}(2«+1) apply Eq. 3.2 ... 86 is even 
“243-1 =“2.(22|-i}(22|+i)^ i apply Eq. 3.1 ... 43 is odd 
“221-1 =口2.(2,�-1}(2'»+如 apply Eq. 3.1 ... 21 is odd 
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“2--1 =“(2'-iM2M apply Eq. 3.2 ... 10 is even 
“2'-i =“2V-iK2'+i)fi apply Eq. 3.1 ... 5 is odd 
。2M =“(2'-1}(2'+1) 二 “(2+1) apply Eq. 3.2 ... 2 i s even 
For m=173 bit, it takes 10 multiplication operations. 
The pseudo-code is shown below-
Given a in F2"', find a'l. 
Convert m into binary format 
s = (number of bits in m) • 1 
Set temp 1 = a 
For i = s downto 0 
Set temp2 = temp 1 
Set shift = shift m to right by s bit(s) 
Rotate temp2 to left "truncate (shift)" bit(s) 
temp 1 = temp 1 x temp2 
If shift is odd 
Rotate temp 1 to left 1 bit 
temp 1 = temp 1 x a 
End 
End 
Set a'l = Rotate tempi to left 1 bit 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed about the theory of the ONB finite field 
arithmetic. It was considered the fastest implementation method in the 
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elliptic curve cryptography at the present time. Furthermore, the 
efficient algorithm in ONB arithmetic also provides the benefit for low 
power consumption and small area design. This research has taken an 
advantage of these to implement a 173-bit Type II ONB elliptic curve 
cryptosystem. 
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Chapter 4 Introduction to Elliptic Curve 
Mathematics 
4.1 Introduction 
The Elliptic Curve theory has been well studied by mathematicians 
for many years, and it has yielded some significant results in an 
application of the cryptographic field in the later century. Actually, 
these curves are the simple functions that contains x and y coordinates. 
Besides real number system, these curves can also be applied into finite 
field arithmetic over polynomial basis and optimal normal basis number 
systems. 
In this chapter, the elliptic curves over real number system will be 
introduced first as it is easier to interpret. Afterwards, the elliptic curves 
over finite field are detailed. For an efficient hardware implementation, 
projective coordinates system will be introduced. Finally, the applications 
in cryptography using the elliptic curves are shown. 
4.2 Mathematical Background of Elliptic Curves 
The following general equation is the ‘Weierstrass，，form of the 
elliptic curves, where ai, a2, as, a4 and ae are the coefficients, x and y 
cover a plane, this plane can be real, complex, integer, polynomial basis, 
optimal normal basis and any other kind of field element. 
y^ + a^xy + a^y = x^ + a^x^ + a^x + 
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In 1985，Koblitz [6] and Miller [7] proposed using elliptic curves for 
cryptographic purposed. They found that when taking any two points on 
the same elliptic curve, add them together, the resulting point also lie on 
the same curve. This is difficult to figure out which two points adding 
together to get the result, and this is exponential to the key length. 
Therefore, this discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curves is an 
attractive one way function because there is no sub-exponential attack 
known to solve this problem. 
4.3 Elliptic Curve over Real Number System 
This section starts with the most familiar elliptic curve over the real 
number system on a real plane. The following equation is the simple form 
of elliptic curve, which will use in this section: 
By putting sl4 = "8 and ae = 8. F i ^ r e 4.1 shows the plot of this curve. 
y^  = x^  - 8x + 8 
in I 1 I I I I 1 1 1 1 J 
- 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
X 
Figure 4.1. Plot of Elliptic Curve： y2 = x^ - 8x + 8 
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4.3.1 Order of the Elliptic Curves 
The term order of the elliptic curves is defined by the number of 
elements lie on the elliptic curve over a finite field, and this must satisfy 
“Hasse's Theorem". 
N-{q + l)\<2^ 
Where Nis the order of the curve and ^is the field size. 
4.3.2 Negation of Point P 
In the elliptic curves, for every solvable value of x, there exist two 
values of y. 
土少= V;c3—8;C + 8 
Therefore, the relationship between P a n d - P is: 
If F=(x, yX then - P = (x, -y). 
4.3.3 Point at Infinity 
Since, the magic of the elliptic curve is adding two point lies on this 
curve, and get another point lies on the same curve. Therefore, we need 
to find a way for the "Addition" of two points. Before that, we define a 
point at infinity, called "Identity element, 0J' . 
This is a special point on the elliptic curves and has two major 
properties. One of the major properties of this point is when adding CL 
with other points on the curve would give the same point back. i.e. 
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(P) + ( O J = (P) 
The other property is when adding two points, P and -P, the 
resulting point will come to the point at infinity, CL. See F i ^ r e 4.2. 
y^  = x^  - 8x + 8 
10 
[ 11 Point at infinity / 
8. I / 
6 - I / 
丄P = ( X , y) / 
I d><； 
-6- I \ 
- 8 - I \ 
-in I I I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 -J 
".5 .4 .3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
X 
Figure 4.2. Adding P and - P to get the point at infinity 
The point at infinity is the special case of the elliptic curves that 
defined by the mathematicians who want to fulfill all the cases. Under 
normal conditions, the engineers would avoid the occurrence of this 
special case. 
4.3.4 Elliptic Curve Addition 
Elliptic Curve Addition is known as the point addition. In 
mathematical representation, it is R = P + Q. 
Figure 4.3 shows the geometrical relationship of the curve addition. 
Suppose there are two distinct points P and Q lie on the curve and 
connecting these two points by a line, it must passing through another 
point which lies on the same curve -R, by negating the y-coordinate o f -R , 
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the solution R is obtained. 
In mathematical approach, by solving the simultaneous equations on 
the elliptic curve and the straight line, three solutions we can solved 
because the elliptic curve equation variable ‘X，is in the power of three. 
This is not difficult to understand that why the line must intersect 
another point on the elliptic curve. 
y2 = - 8x + 8 
M 
in I I 1 I I I I 1 1 1 J 
- 5 - 4 - 3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
X 
F i ^ r e 4.3. Curve Addition of Elliptic Curve points 
4.3.5 Elliptic Curve Doubling 
Elliptic Curve Doubling is a special case in Curve Addition. The line 
is tangent to the curve at point P and then intersecting at another point 
R. This is shown in Figure 4.4. 
In mathematical approach, firstly, by differentiating the elliptic 
curve, and finding the slope of the straight line, i.e. the gradient at point 
P (XI’ yi). The coordinates -R can be solved by finding the intersecting 
point of the elliptic curve and that line. 
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y^  = x^  - 8x + 8 
：丨 / 
- 8 . \ 
1 Q I I I I I 1 I I 1 J 
- 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
X 
Figure 4.4. Curve Doubling of Elliptic Curve point 
4.3.6 Equations of Curve Addition and Curve Doubling 
Here are the mathematical equations to find the solution of R: 
Let 
" ( W i ) 
0 = 02，少 2) 
R = ix„y,) = P + Q 
X^ = 0 2 —太I 一 Xj 
少 3 = 外 X 1 + X 3 ) -少丨 
where 
e = hlLL. if p 右 Q {Curve Addition) 
or 
没=3太1 + � if P = Q {Curve Doubling) 
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4.4 Elliptic Curve over Finite Fields Number 
System 
Because of the efficiency, the elliptic curve cryptography always 
implements over the finite fields curves rather than real number curves. 
Among the finite fields, polynomial basis and optimal normal basis 
representations are favor in both software and hardware 
implementations respectively. This is because of the finite fields 
arithmetic is more efficient than the real number arithmetic. Details can 
refer to Chapter 3. 
Since the arithmetic operations in the finite fields are different from 
real number arithmetic, there has another set of equations different from 
the one stated in Chapter 4.3. Moreover, to avoid the cryptanalyst attack 
the system easily, the mathematicians have proved that using a 
"non-supersingular" elliptic curve could provide a maximum benefit of 
security. 
Here is the general form of "non-supersin^ar" elliptic curve. 
y^ +xy = x^ + a^x^ + a^ 
Where a2, ae are finite field number and ae 0. 
4.4.1 Elliptic Curve Operations in Optimal Normal Basis Number 
System 
This section shows the set of equations of elliptic curves using in the 
optimal normal basis arithmetic. 
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Let 
户= ( W i ) 
Q = {x2,yi) 
灭= ( W 3 ) 
For curve addition, P9tQ;R = p + Q 
；C3 = ^^ + +X2 +(32 
For curve doubling, P = Q； R = 2 Q 
太1 
+ 0 + a2 
The number of finite field operations involved in the curve operations is 
shown in Table 4.1. 
4.4.2 Elliptic Curve Operations in Projective Coordinates 
In the previous section, the set of curve operation equations are in 
affine coordinates (i.e. only x, y axis are involved). In affine coordinates, 
both curve addition and doubling consist of one field inversion operation. 
As we have discussed in Chapter 3，field inversion process is the most 
time consuming process in field operation, to eliminate this field 
inversion in every curve operations, a projective coordinates system is 
suggested in the implementation of elliptic curve. 
Projective coordinates system consists of x, y, z axis, every point in 
affine coordinates (x, y) can be converted to projective coordinates (x, y, z) 
and vice versa. The conversion methods are given as follows-
33 
Chapter 4 Introduction to Elliptic Curve Mathematics 
Affine coordinates to Projective coordinates 
P{x,y)-^Pix,y,\) 
Projective coordinates to Affine coordinates 
z J 
where P, Q and F , Q，are in affine coordinates and projective coordinates 
respectively. 
The conversion from affine coordinates to projective coordinates is 
easy, just assigning 1 to z-coordinate is enough, no extra operation 
required. However, when converting projective coordinates to affine 
coordinates, the z-axis is needed to convert to 1 first by finding the 
inverse of z, and then multiply the inverse of z to x and y coordinates 
respectively as shown above. 
4.4.3 Elliptic Curve Equations in Projective Coordinates 
This section will show the equations of the curve operations in the 
projective coordinates. 
Let 
！2 = 02’ 少2，Z2) 
/? = (X3，_y3，Z3) 
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For curve addition, P;^Q;R = P + Q 
A — + 
B = yi^i + 少1 
C = A + B 
JC3 = AD 
y^ =CD + Ay 
For curve doubling, P = Q； R = 2 Q 
•/I 一 
B = a^^zl +^2 
X3 =AB 
Affine Coordinates Projective Coordinates 
Addition Doubling Addition Doubling 
Field Addition 9 5 7 4 
Field Squaring 1 2 1 6 
Field Multiplication 2 2 13 7 
Field Inversion 1 1 0 0 
Table 4.1. The relationship between finite field operation and curve 
operation in different coordinates system 
In the above table, we can conclude that using projective coordinates 
should have a better performance that affine coordinates. It was because 
in implementing 173 bit elliptic curve as an example, one field inversion 
operation consists of ten field multiplication operations, although the 
number of multiplications in projective coordinates increased, the overall 
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performance can be increased. 
4.5 Curve Multiplication 
The Elliptic Curve Multiplication is defined by repeating the Elliptic 
Curve Addition. The rule of this multiplication is described as follows. 
Let 
尸=Cw丨） 
2 =(文2，少 2) 
For 
Q = cxP 
Q = P + P + "- + P (c times) 
Where P, Q are the points lie on the elliptic curve over affine coordinates, 
and c is an integer. 
This is the definition of the curve multiplication. In the computation 
algorithm, we can implement this by curve addition and curve doubling 
operations. The algorithm can be divided into 4 steps and stated below. 
Step 1: convert the integer c into binary form. 
Step 2: count down the integer c bit by bit and start from the second 
MSB to LSB. 
Step 3: if the bit is ‘1，，then compute curve doubling and then curve 
addition； if the bit is ‘0，，then compute curve doubling only. 
Step 4: repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until the LSB is computed. 
For example, suppose we want to compute 21 P. 
Step 1: integer c = 21 = lOlOlii 
Step 2: V 2nd MSB = 0，then compute 2P by doubling. 
Step 3: 3rd MSB = 1，then compute 4P and 5P by doubling and 
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addition respectively. 
Step 4： V 4th MSB = 0，then compute lOP by doubling. 
Step 5: ••• LSB = 1，then compute 20P and 2IP by doubling and 
addition respectively. And the result 2 IP is obtained. 
When implementing the curve multiplication over projective 
coordinates, there have a conversion from projective coordinates back to 
affine coordinates once the multiplication process is done. 
4.6 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Let P(x’y) be a point lies on elliptic curve of order n. The Elliptic 
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is to find the integer k, for 0 
^ k ^ n-l such that Q=kP. 
There is no index-calculus method known for solving the ECDLP 
that has a sub-exponential running time by given Q and P to compute k. 
However, the most efficient algorithm known for solving the ECDLP is 
using Pollard's p method [8]. This algorithm was improved by Gallant, 
Lambert and Vanstone [9] and Wiener and Zuccherato [10] which has an 
expected running time of y f m H elliptic curve operations. Therefore, 
the known methods for computing ECDLP are still exponential in n and 
less efficient than those for factoring and discrete logarithm problem 
used in other cryptography attacking approach. As a result, Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography could be a better cryptosystem over the others with 
the same key sizes. 
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4.7 Public-key Cryptography in Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem 
The elliptic curve cryptosystem can be used as a public key 
cryptosystem. When the parties want to send or receive the private 
information through the insecure channel using ECC, they need to know 
the sender or receiver's public key. Therefore, ECC key pairs are 
generated before the communication. 
In the elliptic curve cryptosystems, the key pair generation method 
is defined as follows. 
Step 1: define a set of elliptic curve domain parameters, include 
elliptic curve equation, (i.e. a2 and ae.) and generator point 
G (x, y), (i.e. the initial point which lies on the specified 
elliptic curve). And these parameters are set public to 
everyone. 
Step 2: select a random number k where 1 ^ k ^ n - 1 (n- order of 
the curve). 
Step 3: Compute Q = kG. (Q is set public to everyone.) 
Then, k and Q are the private key and public key respectively. 
4.8 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange in Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange scheme is the first public key 
algorithm invented by Diffie and Hellman. The purpose of this algorithm 
is to enable two users to exchange a session key (secret key) that can be 
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used for subsequent encryption of the messages. The generation method 
of the session key is defined as follows. 
Step 1: suppose there are two users Alice and Bob who have already 
known the elliptic curve domain parameters. 
Step 2: then, both of them generate their own public key pair first, 
(i.e. Alice： ka, Qa； Bob: kb, Qb). 
Step 3: they can send their own public key (Qa and Qb) to the other. 
Step 4' Once they exchange their public key, they can compute the 
session key by multiplying their own private key with the 
other's public key like that: 
session key =众„ x g办 
4.9 Summary 
In this chapter, the idea of elliptic curve over real number and finite 
field coordinates systems were introduced. And then follow with the 
comparison between the number of operations in the af&ne coordinates 
and the projective coordinates over the finite fields. We can conclude that 
using projective coordinates system is more efficient than affine 
coordinates system. Afterwards, two of the elliptic curve applications, 
public key cryptography and Dif&e-Hellman key exchange, were 
described. And these applications still have no known sub-exponential 
time algorithm to solve. 
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Chapter 5 Design Architecture 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a new implementation of the 173-bit elliptic curve 
over type II ONB is presented. This new architecture is based on the 
optimization of the mathematical equations to reduce the number of 
multiplication used. Furthermore, the combination of the field operations 
into single instruction would reduce the frequently fetch and retrieved 
data between ALU and register unit. The following sections will dissect 
the research part by part. 
5.2 Criteria for the Low Power System Design 
One of the objectives of this research is low power consumption. It 
has many different ways to achieve this goal. They are summarized as 
follows-
Use of efficient algorithm： 
In this research, TVpe II ONB is chosen rather than using 
polynomial basis representation or even prime field. It was because the 
multiplication operation is the most efficient one than the others, and the 
inversion operation can be avoid by using projective coordinates. 
Moreover, the newly proposed idea has simplified the mathematical 
equations to save one multiplication operation in curve addition. These 
improvements directly reduce the number of operations in the 
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computation of the results, so that, the overall power consumption can be 
reduced. 
Using standard cell library: 
This research is using 0.35um technology standard cell library 
provided by Austria Micro System (AMS). Compared with the other 
hardware design approach such as FPGA, the standard cell library 
provided a more power efficient solution by minimizing the routing 
distance of the wires between the logic gates which would reduce the 
capacitive loading in the metal lines. Furthermore, the standard cell 
library provided by the manufacture is compact, especially the complex 
gates. This is also a benefit to high speed low power design. 
Reduce the switching activities of the logic: 
For digital design, the power consumption can be expressed by this 
formula-
P = afCV^ 
where a is the switching activities of the logic gates, f is the operating 
frequency of the system, C is the overall parasitic capacitance, and V is 
the operating voltage. 
Since the switching activities of the logic is directly proportional to 
the power consumption, minimize the variable a is a possible solution. 
5.3 Simplification in ONB Curve Addition 
Equations over Projective Coordinates 
Recall the elliptic curve mathematical equation over projective 
coordinates described in Chapter 4.4.3. 
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Curve Addition：? * Q 
A = +x, Eq. 5.1 
B^y^z^ Eq. 5.2 
C = A + B Eq. 5.3 
D = A^(A + az^)+z^BC Eq. 5.4 
X3 = AD 
少3 =CD + A {^Bx^  +Ay^) Eq. 5.5 
Z3 = A^z^ 
The mathematical expression shown above is commonly used 
equations in the implementation of ONB elliptic curve cryptosystems 
nowadays. This operation involves 13 multiplications, 7 additions and 1 
squaring. 
The equations shown below are the new expression of the curve 
addition operation. 
A = X2Z1 + Xj Eq. 5.6 
B = y2Z^  Eq. 5.7 
D = A^(A + az,)+z,{AB + B^) Eq. 5.8 
= AD 
y^  =AD + b{a^x^ Eq. 5.9 
Z3 = A'z, 
This operation involves 12 multiplications, 8 additions and 2 
squaring, which can save 1 field multiplication operation. The proof is 
based on the original expression as shown below. 
Put (Eq. 5.3) into (Eq. 5.4), we get (Eq. 5.8) 
Put (Eq. 5.3) into (Eq. 5.5) to compute ya, we have: 
少 3 =GD +乂 + 办丨） 
= (A + B)D + A^Bxi+AyJ 
= AD + B{A^XI 
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which is the same as (Eq. 5.9). Since the term AD and A^ in ya, can be 
calculated in X3 and Z3 respectively, 1 field multiplication is saved. In 
conclusion, over 90% of the curve operations involve the field 
multiplication, reduction of the field multiplication would greatly 
enhance the overall performance of the system. 
5.4 Finite Field Adder Architecture 
The finite field operations consist of four major operators. They are 
addition, squaring, multiplication and inversion. Since, the inversion 
algorithm is derived by several multiplications and squaring. Therefore, 
only the other three operators can be implemented on the ALU. 
Adding two finite field numbers is simple. The result is just computed by 
applying bitwise exclusive-OR on two input numbers. 
Figure 5.1. The circuit design of the finite field addition 
In the figure, 173 XOR gates are used to compute the addition in parallel, 
Ci = a i e b i for i = 0 to 172. 
5.5 Finite Field Squaring Architecture 
Squaring of the finite field number is a special case of the 
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multiplication. It can be implemented by using multiplexer to rotate the 
input 1 bit to left as shown below. In Figure 5.2，173 multiplexers are 
used in parallel to select the input a to the output. When the "Ctrl" signal 
is reset, the output c store the value of a, otherwise, the output c store 
the value of a^ which is rotating 1 bit to left. 
Ctrl 
a I � 17? 0^-172 
^0-172 I > 0 
X 173 
Z) “ ~ I > Co.i72 
3 ：^ 
d 1-172.0 1 
Figure 5.2. The circuit diagram of the finite field squaring 
5.6 Finite Field Multiplier Architecture 
Since we have discussed about the theory behind the field multiplier 
in Chapter 3，in this section, the optimized low power consumption GF 
(2173) parallel multiplication architecture is proposed. The idea of this 
architecture is efficiently use of Latches in FIFO pipelines by reducing 
the switching activities in the register unit. When latching the data in 
the registers, a significant portion of power is consumed in the latches 
and the clock tree rather than the combinatorial logics, therefore, 
decreasing the number of switching in flip flops would greatly reduce the 
overall power consumption. Figure 5.3 shows the combinatorial logic 
used in the multiplier element. It is a 3-level logic, 3 gate delays are 
needed to wait for the result. The input of bit pattern aij and by to the 
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multiplier element is based on the lambda matrix (see Appendix). 
a：： [z> J 
：二 • 
Figure 5.3. The combinatorial logics used in multiplier element 
The input ay, bij are the multiplier and multiplicand over F2I73 
respectively, c is the partial product in the previous state and c，is the 
partial product in the current state. The mechanism of this field 
multiplier circuit is shown in F i ^ r e 5.4. In the figure, block ME 
represents "multiplier element" and block FF is the flip flop to hold data. 
At the beginning, data C is initialized to 0. In the first clock cycle, data A 
and data B is input into the circuit, the bit pattern of data A and data B 
then rearrange inside the "wiring" block, and pass into ME and FF. The 
"wiring" block does not consist any logic cell, it is only a rewiring of the 
connections based on the lambda matrix described in Chapter 3.5.6. The 
data stored in the FF is the partial product C，which is ready to feedback 
in the next cycle. Both A, B and C are needed to rotate 1 bit to left in each 
cycle as shown in the fi^re. Since, this is a 173-bit field multiplier, the 
final product will be stored in C after 173 clock cycles. 
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A f 一 Rotate 1 bit to left 
I  
B _ _ Rotate 1 bit to left 
aiJ . I ) 
• bid ME • FF c’o 
Co I 
aij ’ 
\ bij me . FF + c’i 
W ci  
O 
^ I j j 卜 1 > • “ 
广 C — • a , — — —— 
bij ME • FF c’i7i 
Cl71  
aid 
bij ME • FF + c’m 
I _ _ C172 I I L _ J i 
Rotate 1 bit to left “ 
Figure 5.4. The finite field multiplier circuit over 
5.7 3-way Parallel Finite Field Multiplier 
Previous section shown is the finite field multiplier proposed by G. B. 
Agnew [11]. This multiplier has some disadvantages that are not suitable 
in low power design. 
In each multiplication, the flip flops used in the circuit are operated 
frequently. Since the flip flop is one of the most high power consumption 
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logic cells, the reduction of the switching activity of the flip flop would 
reduce the power consumption greatly. Furthermore, the logic delay in 
the flip flops is also a serious problem that reduces the overall speed of 
the circuit. In this circuit, 173 logic delays by the flip flops are wasted in 
each multiplication. Therefore, the efficient use of the flip flops is 
essential to low power design. 
c [IZ>  
Figure 5.5. The used of parallel combinatorial logic in multiplier 
element 
To overcome these problems, the multiplier element can be modified 
to compute 3 cycles at a time as shown in Figure 5.5. Simply replace the 
multiplier element by this one, only 44 clock cycles are used to complete 
each multiplication. Compare with the original one using 173 clock cycles, 
over 70% power and time consumption inside flip flops can be saved. 
5.8 Finite Field Arithmetic Logic Unit 
In this section, a newly proposed finite field ALU is presented. This 
ALU combines all the field operations into single instruction, so that, the 
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data transfer between ALU and the registers are greatly reduced. As a 
result, the power consumption and the propagation delay due to the 
registers can be minimized. 
Refer to the mathematical equations over projective coordinates, 
they can be arranged into the form: Q = AxB + C 
Let 
R2 = y, 
R3 = z^ 
R4 = X2 
穴5 =少2 
R6 = z^ 
Curve Addition 
R9 = mxR6 + R4 
mO = R2xR6 + R5 
Rn = R7xR6 + R9 
Rl2 = R9xR\0 + Rl0^ 
R\2 = R\2xR6 + 0 
R\2 = R9^xRll + R\2 
mi = R9xRl2 + 0 
m2 = R9^xR4 + Rl2 
Rn = m0xRl2 + R\\ 
R9 = R9^xR9 + 0 
R5 = R9xR5 + R\2 
R6 = R9xR6 + 0 
R4 = Rn 
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Curve Doubling 
R9 = R4xR6 + 0 
RlO = R6'xRS + R4' 
Rll = R9xR\0 + 0 
R\2 = R5xR6 + R4^ 
R\2 = m0xRl2 + R\l 
R5 = R4^xR9 + R\2 
R6 = R9^xR9 + 0 
R4 = Rll 
The code shown above is the computation of the curve operations. It 
can be seen that implementing the function: Q = AxB + C is enough for 
the curve operations. Combining these operations would not increase the 
hardware usage, and the execution time would be decreased due to the 
"squaring" operation is integrated into the proposed architecture, so that 
an extra clock cycle for the squaring process is omitted. F i ^ r e 5.6 shows 
the circuit d ia^am of the ALU. 
^ ^ 口 
一 I 一 Q 
r V � 1 ^ l i： 夸 ^ C C Z D ^ 爸 一 ^ ^ HE E _ 
Figure 5.6. The finite field arithmetic logic unit 
The function of the 8 to 1 multiplexer is designed for the inversion 
operation to avoid the continuous rotating process. The input R, R2，R4， 
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R5，RIO, R21, R43 and R®® represents the number of bit need to rotate (i.e. 
R2 ： rotate 2 bit to left, R4 : rotate 4 bit to left and so on). Since R is a 173 
databus, in databus representation, the input of the 8 to 1 multiplexer 
are: 
For R = <0 : 172> 
R2 = < 2 : 172’ 0 : 1> 
R4 = < 4 : 172，0 : 3> 
R5 = <5 : 172’ 0 : 4> 
RIO = < 1 0 : 172，0 : 9 > 
R21 = < 2 1 ： 172, 0 :20> 
R43 = <43 : 172，0 : 42> 
R86 = <86 : 172，0 : 85> 
5.9 Elliptic Curve Crypto-processor Control Unit 
The curve operations described in the previous section are the 
implementation of the finite field ALU. In the system level, a control unit 
is designed to control the whole system. This control unit has two major 
functions. Firstly, it is used to control the data transfer between the 
register unit and the finite field ALU. Secondly, it controls the finite field 
ALU to execute suitable curve operations. Figure 5.7 shows the 
architecture of the elliptic curve crypto-processor control unit. 
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Curve Multiplication 
I I  
Curve Addition Curve Doubling 
Finite Field ALU 
^ 
\ / 
• Register  
/ \ 
, 义 少 ^ Control Path 
I/O port < ^ = > Data Path 
Figure 5.7. The architecture of Elliptic Curve Crypto-processor 
control unit 
First of all, when a start signal received, the processor performs the 
Curve Multiplication (CM) based on the private key stored in the register 
unit. When the current bit of the private key is set, CM will send a start 
signal to Curve Doubling (CD) block and then Curve Addition (CA) block 
after CD is done. When the current bit of the private key is reset, CM will 
only send a start signal to CD block to compute curve doubling, no curve 
addition is needed. 
Both CD and CA blocks are the control units to control the relative 
data fetch and retrieved from the register unit and also control the 
computation inside the finite field ALU. 
When the calculation is complete, the results will store in the 
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register unit and ready to be retrieved from the I/O pad. 
5.10 Register Unit 
One of the advantages of ECC is its less memory requirements, there 
are only 8 parameters involves in the elliptic curve cryptosystems in this 
research, they are' 
> the coefficients a2 in the elliptic curve equation, 
> the coefficients SLG in the elliptic curve equation, 
> x-coordinates of the generator (elliptic curve point), 
> y-coordinates of the generator (elliptic curve point), 
> x-coordinates of the public key (elliptic curve point), 
> y-coordinates of the public key (elliptic curve point), 
> z-coordinates of the public key (elliptic curve point), and 
> the private key which is a 173 bit random number. 
Including 4 extra variables to store the temporary results during the 
curve operations, totally only 173x12=2076 bit memory is needed for 
173-bit ECC. This is extremely low memory usage compared with 
1024-RSA. Figure 5.8 shows the register allocation inside the 
crypto-processor. 
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Figure 5.8. Configuration of the register unit 
5.11 Summary 
In this chapter, the idea of the design methodology is proposed. It 
begins with the criteria essential for the low power design, and then 
based on these criteria we improve the processor so that it can fulfill the 
requirements. By modifying the mathematical expressions in the elliptic 
curve equations and reducing the switching activities of the logic gates, 
the processor is a low power consumption one. 
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Chapter 6 Specifications and 
Communication Protocol of the IC 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the specifications of the elliptic curve cryptosystem 
integrated circuit are presented. This integrated circuit was fabricated 
using AMS 0.35um technology with 48-pin dual-in-line packaging. 
Among these 48 pins, 5 are power sources, 5 are grounds, 16 are data 
I/Os and the remaining 22 are the control signals. The communication 
protocol will be described after the specification. 
6.2 Specifications 
The system architecture of the design is shown in Figure 6.1 and 
Figure 6.2 shown is the pin assignment, the description of the pins can be 
found in Table 6.1. 
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I I 1 i  
„ li a a n 
Reset 1 1 
Clk 1 1 




3 M e m o r y ‘ 
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F i e l d 
3 / W N A L U 
InRSel - y - — 
^ 
I / O I n t e r f a c e 
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Figure 6.1. The system architecture of the Elliptic Curve cryptosystem 
w  
AllFinish— 1 48 — AddFinish 
DblFinish — — GND 
InvFinish— — InRSC 
V D D — — InRSB 
Reset — — InRSA 
Clk— — OutRSA 
Start — — VDD 
G N D — —OutRS 已 
InSelA — — OutRSC 
InSelB — — I / 0 J 5 
InSeIC — — G N D 
InSelD — —I /O J 4 
V D D — — I / 0 J 3 
OutSelA — — I / O J 2 
OutSelB — — 1/0J1 
OutSeIC — —VDD 
OutSelD — —I /O J O 
GND — —1/0_9 
l/0_0 — —1/0_8 
I/O J — — E N 
I/O一2— — G N D 
l/0_3 — —1/0_7 
V D D — —1/0_6 
l/0_4 — 24 25 —1/0_5 
Figure 6.2. Pin assignment of the Elliptic Curve integrated circuit 
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Pin Name I/O TVpe Description 
4,13,23,33,42 VDD Input Power Supply 
8,18,28,38,47 GND Input Ground 
The signal is set when the key is 
1 AllFinish Output 
generated. 
The signal is set when the curve 
2 DblFinish Output 
doubling is done. 
The signal is set when the field 
3 InvFinish Output 
inversion is done. 
Master reset signal to reset the 
5 Reset Input 
circuit. 
6 Clk Input Clock signal. 
The operation will start when the 
7 Start Input 
rising edge is detected. 
, � Write the input data from the data 
9’ 10，11，12 InSel(A-D) Input 
bus to the selected memory location. 
Fetch the data from the selected 
14,15,16，17 OutSel(A-D) Input memory location to the output data 
bus. 
19-22,24-27’ , � Input/ 
I/O一(0-15) 16-bit bidirectional data bus. 
30-32,34-37,39 Output 
Data bus load data from the pin 
29 EN Input when the bit is set, write data to the 
pin when the bit is reset. 
, � Select the memory location to be 
40,41,43 OutRS(A-C) Input 
output. 
j � Select the memory location to be 
44,45,46 InRS(A-C) Input 
written. 
The signal is set when the curve 
48 AddFinish Output 
addition is done. 
Table 6.1. Description of the pin assignment 
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6.3 Communication Protocol 
The operation of this integrated circuit is simple. Firstly, prepare all 
the input parameters, and then load all these data into the register unit 
and follow with a starting signal, the result will be computed 
automatically and an acknowledgement signal is given out once the 
result is complete. 
This integrated circuit uses 16-bit databus as a communication path 
to the peripheral. Since, the data are 173 bit length, each data will be 
divided into 173/16=11 parts and input to the register unit part by part. 
Table 6.2 shows the relationship between the control signals and the bits 
of data to be written in. 
InSel / OutSel Data written 
A B C D 
0 0 0 0 Bit (15. . . 0) 
0 0 0 1 Bit (31 ... 16) 
0 0 1 0 Bit (47 ... 32) 
0 0 1 1 Bit (63 ... 48) 
0 1 0 0 Bit (79 . . .64) 
0 1 0 1 Bit (95 ... 80) 
0 1 1 0 Bit (111 ... 96) 
0 1 1 1 Bit (127.. . 112) 
1 0 0 0 Bit ( 143... 128) 
1 0 0 1 Bit ( 159 ... 144) 
1 0 1 0 Bit ( 172... 160) 
1 0 1 1 Unused 
1 1 X X Unused  
Table 6.2. The relationship between the control and the mapping of 
data 
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Several parameters such as the generator, a2, ae and the private key 
should be loaded into the register unit before the computation start. 
Table 6.3 shows how these parameters loaded into the register unit. 
When generating the public key pair, x, ycoordinates of the generator 
should load into the address 010 and Oil respectively, otherwise, x, 
ycoordinates of the public key should load into that address when 
computing the Di£B.e-HeUman key exchange. 
InRS / Out RS 
Parameter written into the register unit 
A B C 
0 0 0 x-coordinate of the generator 
0 0 1 ycoordinate of the generator 
0 1 0 x-coordinate of the generator or the public key 
O i l y-coordinate of the generator or the public key 
1 0 0 a2 
1 0 1 ae 
1 1 0 The private key 
1 1 1 unused 
Table 6.3. The relationship between the control and the parameters 
written into the register unit 
After all the parameters have loaded into the circuit already, the 
operation can be activated by feeding a pulse into the "Start" signal. 
When the result is complete, the "AUFinish" signal will change to logic 
high. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a post-layout simulation of the public key generation 
and the session key generation is presented. The simulation is conducted 
by Verilog-XL in Cadence under 3 V power supply at 27°C, the operating 
frequency is 20MHz. In the following sections, the private keys are 
randomly chosen and the numbers are represented in hexadecimal form 
with MSB on the LHS. 
The measurement results will also be given in this chapter, including 
the comparison between the post-layout simulation result and the testing 
result, and the power consumption of this crypto-processor. Some 
discussions about this crypto-processor are given in the end of this 
chapter. 
7.2 Results of the Public-key Cryptography 
In this section, two sets of the public key pair are generated using 
the same curve parameters. These results will be forwarded to the next 
section for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
Example I: 
Input: 
az = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
ae = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOOOOOOA 
Generator- P 
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X = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
y = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Private Key A: 
KA = 07EA 1ECCE3FB A449B1B6 185262CB 4EA6A7 0B 2CFDAC21 
Output-
Public Key (KpubA): 
X = 0 4 0 0 4 5 4 7 4 1 1 3 8 0BAB8 5A 66F69A87 B4F0A4E2 6 4 D 5 8 4 4 2 
y = 0 7 3 7 7026E7BD DC66B577 7 5 8 A 5 4 2 6 2A85D9BA 2 8 2 2 3 5 A 2 
I I [| tol^ I f ^ J 丨Wa，,aI ZooKiInX Ij ZoonOutX I IZnOutXPul j g-f-ArnlI CrtMarker || Des 
11''7'ViVM.V-nViViVmViw'r.'i• Ili'-TTTm M；：mi mi'i!i m ； ViV'7 ”.,》.,—.“..•..,.• •....“..... I «•-.• .....•••••-••••••..-,1 • 邏 ..•-.•..•.....•.... .•....••....."....„.._..•. i 
TimeA - 0(0) ps jCursorl - 6,723,729,0 
Sim End - 10,000, 000,000 ps Cuic3or2 » 0 p3 ; 
Cur2-Curl - -6,723, 729.000 pa 0 ： ,10,000,000, 
！ ^WZw 
A d d P i n i s h • 0 •llllllllllllllllllllinilllllllllllllllllllllllllll;  
AllTinish - 1 ； ^ 
Clk • 1 
DblTinish . 0 lllllllllllllllllllBllimillllll  
InvFinish • 1 ；  
Start • 0 _ i  
01(172:0) • 'h IFFF FFFFFFFF ITFFFFFF FPFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFC IFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFll'FFFFFFFFF* 
Q2I172:01 - 'h IFFF ITFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF PFFFFFFB IFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF^FFFFFFFFF* 
Q41172:01 • 'h IBFF BAB8BEEC 7F4S47A5 99096578 4B0FSB1D 9B2A7BBD ^ I B F F B A B S B * 
Q5|172;0] - 'h 18C8 8FD91842 23994A88 8A7SABD9 D57A264S D7DDCASD 1^6c86fD讨*  
061172:0] - 'h 0000 OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO 
Q7[172.0) • 'h irrr rrrrrrrr FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF r m r r r r rrrrrrrc IFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF]FFFFFFFFFF~ 画 
Q8|172;0] - 'h IFFF FCFFFFPF FFFFFEFF FPFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFS IFFFFCFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFyFFrFFFFFF* | 
Q91172:01 • 'h ODlC 938D0C62 4EB356E4 21B6B91A BDEC62DD S37FDCF7 1 ' 6 d 1 c 9 3 8 D 0 * j 
Datall72:01 • 'h 07EA 1ECCE3FB A449B1B6 185262CB 2CFDAC21 07EMECCE3FBM49B1B6185262CB4EA* 
y r 
F( l - r ^ i 
F i ^ r e 7.1. The postlayout simulation of the public key pair 
(Example 1) 
In Figure 7.1，the public key pair is shown in the waveform "Q4" and 
“Q5，，，where Q4 and Q5 are the complement of x and y-coordinates of the 
public key respectively. And "Data" is the private key. The names of these 
waveforms are also applied to the following waveforms. In this example, 
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the computat ion t ime is about 6 .72ms. 
E x a m p l e II: 
Input-
a2 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
as = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000000OA 
Generator"- P 
X = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
y = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Private Key B： 
KB = 1FE9 12FE919F 52C74DE4 477E45E4 2367C21A E079D1E2 
Output: 
Public Key (KpubB): 
X = 0 2 0 4 B2A9CBBF 448A84E0 3 D 3 2 4 0 2 3 7CE20C0E F 3 5 1 2 7 8 0 
y = 03A9 5AEBEFC2 19E83E06 9149AC7F 278566BD D82BB463 
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I SU&abcu W«vefom:l IKIUBIBH 
j U ^ |j Oit —II t:uF-sj II F-flvt- II II ZoonInX || Zooi»C^ tX |j e^ -^ rd |j CrtHaH^jDesBrous：! |j Binary 一 | j .>:tq| ^ 
TUeA • 0(0) p»H :Cur3orr'^?872rS9r000'7^'"'""n 
Si» End • 10,000,000.000 pa |^r，or2 •Op， j  
Cuc2-Curl • -6,872.529,000 pa |o ,1,000,000,000 000,000, OOP j.7, 000,000,000 
i j 观 Groups— TfjH 
Addrini^h • 0 pill丨丨隱III丨_i丨丨丨丨••imi_imn_iii imiiit fc  
二 : ； I ‘ i f 
DbiTinish • 0 |niHmiimm_Hi__ii_iiiiiB_i_iMiBiHiii_ii| | 
InvFinish • 1 | j  
Start • 0 I ! 
Q1U72.01 • 'h irrr rrrrrrrr rrmrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrFFr rrrrrrrc |irrrFFrrrrrFFrrFFFrrrFrFFFFrrrFFrrFFrrrr][Frc 
Q2[172:0| • 'h irrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrFrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrB |iFrrrrFrFFrrrFrFrrrrrrrFrrrrrrrFrrrrFrrrrrFB 
04[172:0] - 'h lOFB 4D563440 BB7S7Bir C2CDBFDC 831DF3rl OCAED87F |inill_M»_W_IHII_imw||niDDinMWI圔•丨昨4D5S3440b6757^ 
Q5[172:0] - 'h 1C56 A514103Q E617Clr9 6C665380 D87A9942 27D44B9C |lMIIWMIWW_IHHimwnniilH|MI••圓_•〕丨 56A514103DEgT7c^ 
061172:01 • ' h 0000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 |i l lMlillll lWBWIIIIIIIllH|MH|llHlllimi;OOODDDOOODDOOOOOO* 
07(172:01 • 'h irrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrc |irrrFFFFrFrrrrFFFrFrrFFrrFrFrFFFrFrFrFFrFFFc 
08丨172:01 - 'h irrr rcrrrrrr rrrrrtrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrs |irrrFCFFFFrrFrFrriFFrrrrrFrrrFFFFFFFrFFF^rrs 
Q9(172:0] • 'h 172D C48DI:E6F A72rOE79 03M)E61B 105E7CCD F964r4B3 | | — M l — n ^ ^ 1 1 W ^ ^ T 7 2 D C 4 B D E E 6 r A 7 2 F 0 * 
DataU72:0丨• ’h irE9 12rE919r 52C74DE4 477E45E4 2367C21A E079D1E2 |lFE912rE919F52C74DE4477E45E42367C21M079PlE2 
Figure 7.2. The post layout s imulat ion of the public key pair (Example 2) 
The computat ion t ime in th is example i s about 6 .87ms. 
7.3 Results of the Session-key Cryptography 
E x a m p l e I-
Input-
a2 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
ae = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOOOOOOA 
Publ ic Key A: 
X = 0 4 0 0 4 5 4 7 4 1 1 3 8 0BAB85A 66F69A87 B4F0A4E2 6 4 D 5 8 4 4 2 
y = 0 7 3 7 7026E7BD DC66B577 7 5 8 A 5 4 2 6 2A85D9BA 2 8 2 2 3 5 A 2 
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Private Key B： 
Kb = 1FE9 12FE919F 52C74DE4 477E45E4 2367C21A E079D1E2 
Output-
Session Key: KpriB (KpubA) 
X = 05BE 7CBB790A 2 3 7 5 8 8 F 0 4 0 0 2 9 1 2 9 13FCD581 A41CEA04 
y = 1 3 0 5 119305EB A93459EB 5D8CF3FF D15E7062 0DF18C18 
T i i ^ u - 眺 m m 
• 0(0) p9 g jCuroorl - S, 876,329, 000 pa 
Sin End • 10,000,000,000 ps |Cur3or2 • 0 ps ；  
Cur2-Curl • -6, B76. 329,000 pa Bq g. OOP, OOP, ojjo >10, 000,000,000 p: 
1 i IHi Cro^这 IFi 
AddTinish • 0 |iiiiiiiiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiaiiiiiiiiiniiiBiiiii» m m _  
MlTinish - 1 I ； I r 
DblTiniah - 0 |ll•丨»_丨丨丨丨丨丨丨Bl丨BllM丨丨1丨1»1丨》丨丨丨[|1»111丨11丨丨11丨丨BWj | | 
InvFinish • 1 ； 画 
Start - 0 i I 
Ql[172.01 - 'h IBFP BAB8BEEC 7F4547A5 99096S78 4B0PSB1D 962A7BBD lBFFBABeBEEC7F4547A55505g5754B0r5BlD5BSA'|BBD | 
02(172:01 • 'h 18C8 erD9l942 23994M8 8A7SABD9 DS7A2S4S D7DDC\5D 15cfl6FD91545555MA5e5A?5ABD9D57Agg^D7DD^A5D I 
041172:0) • 'h IMl 834486rS DC8A770F BITD6DC6 EC032A7E SBE315rB WWH^WIHIIIniff1IWI_HIIH“iA4i8544flSF5DC:6A7* | 
05[172:0] • 'h OCFA EE6CrAl4 56CDIi614 ft2730C00 2EAiaF9D r20E73E7 |lllWWIfMIMBBIIIIIIllllIIMraWllllBim(flcrM:E6CrM456CBA* | 
Q6|172:0) • 'h 0000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 OOOOODOO ••画•!丨|•丨••丨•••Ml••丨••丨IM•丨丨DO叩。OOQOOOOOOOOO* § 
071172:01 • 'h irrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrc |iFFFrrrrrFFrrrFrrrrrFFrFrrFFrrFrrrrrrrrrFrrc | 
08(172:01 - 'h irrr r c m r r r rrrrrar rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr m m r s |IrrrrcFrrrrrrFrrFEFFrrrrrrrrFrFrrrrrrrrr^rs | 
091172:0) _ 'h OCOO rD712A7S 28942AS9 19436U2 FF5923B2 C308CD7E | 
Datft[172:0] - 'h lrE9 12rE919r 52C74DE4 477E45E4 2367C2U E079D1E2 jlFE912FE919FS2C74DE4477E4SE42367C21AE079blE2 I 
— i S ^ ^ ； ； ； ^ , — r J ^ s i 
Figure 7.3. The postlayout simulation of the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange (using A's public key to generate the session key) 
In this example, the session key is generated by using A's public key, and 
then it is multiplied with the B's private key using curve multiplication. 
The computation time is about 6.88 ms. 
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E x a m p l e II: 
Input" 
a2 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
as = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OOOOOOOA 
Public Key B： 
X = 0 2 0 4 B2A9CBBF 448A84E0 3D324023 7CE20C0E F 3 5 1 2 7 8 0 
y = 03A9 5AEBEFC2 19E83E06 9149AC7F 278566BD D82BB463 
Private Key A: 
Ka = 07EA 1ECCE3FB A449B1B6 185262CB 4EA6A7 0B 2CFDAC21 
Output-
Sess ion Key: KpubB (KpriA) 
X = 05BE 7CBB790A 2 3 7 5 8 8 F 0 4 0 0 2 9 1 2 9 13FCD581 A41CEA04 
y = 1 3 0 5 119305EB A93459EB 5D8CF3FF D15E7062 0DF18C18 
In th i s example, the sess ion key is generated by us ing B，s public key, and 
then i s mult ipl ied with the A's private key us ing curve multiplication. 
The computat ion t ime is about 6.73 ms. Compare Figure 7.3 and Figure 
7.4，we can see that Q4 and Q5 are the same. This is the sess ion key 
generat ion method in ECC. 
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Sin End - lD,aOQ,QOO, QOO ps | C u " o r 2 � O p， ；  
Cur2-Curl • -6.727.529, OOP pa I p | ,10 ODQ, 000, OOP p； 
I i h | Groups I T 
AddFiniah - 0 |||11111111111111111111111111111111( I ' .y . 
AlLFinish - 1 | I | p i 
D b L F i n i a h - 0 I H I U ^ H H H j | | 
InvFinish - 1 i | | 
S t a r t - 0 i I I 
01(172:0) - 'h IDFB 4D563440 BB7S7B1F C2CDBFDC 831DF3F1 OCftEDSTF lDFB4D56344DBB757jlFC2CDB* | | 
Q21172:01 • 'h 1CS6 AS14103D E617C1F9 6EB65380 D87A9942 27D44B9C lC56A514103DE617CljF96EBgri" I | 
04(172:0) • 'h 1A41 834486F5 DC8A770F BPFD6DE6 EC032A7E SBE31SFB I || 
05(172:0) - 'h OCFA EE6CFA14 S6CBA614 A2730C00 2EA18F9D F20E73E7 l l H I H H H i H l l C F ^ l l i ； | | 
q 6 ( 1 7 2 ; 0 1 • ' h 0 0 0 0 OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OQOGOOQO OOOOOOOO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i H H i H H B H i Q l Q n o S a l ； I I 
Q7【172:01 - 'h IFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFPF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFC | iFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFgFFFFFFF* | | 
00(172:0) • 'h IFFF FCFFFFFF FFFFFEFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFS | IFFFFCFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFF* | | 
09(172:0] - 'h 11B2 6F45G2AA B4ED2&D2 8207G1EF 360AE4C6 I j ^ ^ ^ H I H H K n i l l l l E | | 
Data丨172:01 - 'h 07EA 1ECCE3FB A449B1B6 1B5262CB 4EA6A70B 2CFDAC21 107EAlECCE3FBA449BiB618526* | | 
Figure 7.4. The postlayout simulation of the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange (using B，s public key to generate the session key) 
7.4 Comparison with the Existing Crypto-processor 
Since ECC can be implemented by different approaches, for example, 
polynomial basis vs optimal normal basis, affine coordinates system vs 
projective coordinates system. In 2001, a microcoded ECC processor is 
proposed [12]. This processor is implemented by FPGA using optimal 
normal basis representation over projective coordinates. The comparison 
between the proposed ECC processor and the FPGA one is shown in 
Table 7.1. 
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20 MHz 18 MHz 28 MHz 
Frequency reduced 
Execution 
6.8 ms 7.56 ms 11.1ms 31.89% faster 
Time  
59.1% 
Technology 0.35 urn 0.35 urn 0.22 urn 
increased 
Table 7.1. Comparison between the 173-bit ECC Processors 
As shown in Table 7.1, the proposed ECC processor is much better 
than the ECC processor implemented by FPGA. This is mainly due to the 
modification of the mathematical expressions, the use of efficient finite 
field multiplier and the integration of the finite field instructions. 
7.5 Power Consumption 
In the public key pair generation, the maximum measured power 
consumption of the crypto-processor is 95mW when it operates at 18 
MHz and 3 V. In the power saving mode, that is, the clock frequency is 1 
MHz and the power supply is 1.6 V，the crypto-processor consumes at 
most 20mW in the public key pair generation. The power consumption of 
the I/O pads is included here. If we do not count the energy consumed by 
the I/O pads, the power consumption will be smaller. Table 7.2 shows the 
power consumption of this IC under different operating voltage for a 
single key pair generation. 
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3.0 V 95 mW 
2.5 V 54 mW 
2.0 V 33 mW 
1.6 V 20 mW 
Table 7.2. The power consumption of ECC crypto-processor under different 
operating voltage 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
A 173-bit type II Optimal Normal Basis Elliptic Curve 
Crypto-processor is implemented. This processor is a public key 
cryptosystem that can generate the key pair for public key cryptography 
and perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange using the elliptic curve. 
The aim of this research is to optimize the design for low power 
consumption so that it can be applied in the contact-less smartcard 
applications. The advantages of this crypto-processor are summarized as 
follows-
> Reduce the number of field multiplications in curve addition by 
simplification of the mathematical expressions. 
> Reduce the frequency the flip flops used in the field 
multiplication by using 3-way parallel multiplier architecture, so 
that both the power consumption and the propagation delay are 
minimized. 
> Integrate the field addition, squaring and multiplication into one 
single instruction Q = Ay.B-\-C so that the number of the 
registers used is reduced. 
Furthermore, many other advantages of ECC also make it favorable 
in the public key cryptography such as high security strength per bit, 
efficient hardware implementation over finite field systems, etc. 
Since the Elliptic Curve Cryptography is not mature enough and 
there are still spaces for future improvement, we believe that it will 
become broad applied in the cryptographic field and will be dominated in 
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173-bit Type II ONB Multiplication Table 
The following logic expressions are the pin assignment of the 
multiplier element used in the 173-bit field multiplier. These expressions 
are based on the information given in the 173-bit lambda matrix. “•，， 
represents logic AND, “©，，represents logic XOR. 
cOOO = aO • (bl) 
cOOl = a2 • (bl ©bl53) 
c002 = a 4 * ( b l 0 6 e b l 5 4 ) 
c003 = a 6 * ( b l l 9 e b l 3 4 ) 
c004 = a8 • (bl4 ㊉ b87) 
c005 = a l 0 . ( b 5 9 ㊉ b83) 
c006 = a l 2 • ( b 8 0 �b 2 ) 
c007 = a l 4 * ( b 3 9 e b l 3 5 ) 
c008 = a l 6 * ( b 7 i e b l 0 1 ) 
c009 = a l 8 * ( b 9 1 � bl53) 
c010 = a 2 0 * ( b l 4 e b l 4 2 ) 
c011 = a22^(b58 � b89) 
c012 = a24* (b62 ©b82) 
c013 = a 2 6 • ( b 4 0 �b 5 4 ) 
c014 = a28 • (bl61 ® b l ) 
c015 = a30»(b73 ㊉ b76) 
c016 = a 3 2 . ( b l 0 8 e b l 7 2 ) 
c017 = a 3 4 . ( b 5 0 e b 9 3 ) 
c018 = a 3 6 » ( b 7 i e b l 2 7 ) 
cO19 = a38*(blO3 0 b l 3 7 ) 
c020 = a 4 0 * ( b l 4 4 e b l 5 6 ) 
c021 = a 4 2 * ( b 4 3 e b 4 4 ) 
c022 = a44 • (b43 ㊉ bl47) 
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c023 = a 4 6 . ( b 4 4 e b l 6 0 ) 
c024 = a48 • (b 144 ㊉ b 149) 
c025 = a 5 0 » ( b l l i e b l 8 ) 
c026 = a52 • (b66 � b94) 
c027 = a54 • (b40 ㊉ b98) 
c028 = a 5 6 * ( b l 6 2 e b l 5 ) 
cO29 = a58«(b67 0 b l 5 2 ) 
c030 = a60^(bl41 ㊉ bl49) 
cO31 = a 6 2 . ( b l 5 8 0 b l 6 9 ) 
cO32 = a 6 4 . ( b 3 9 0blO7) 
c033 = a 6 6 . ( b 5 0 e b l 2 6 ) 
c034 = a68 • (bl24 ㊉ bl43) 
c035 = a 7 0 * ( b l 0 i e b l 7 ) 
c036 = a72 • (b95 ® b25) 
c037 = a 7 4 . (b94 0 b l 5 9 ) 
c038 = a76 • (b67 0 b26) 
c039 = a 7 8 _ ( b l 0 6 e b l 5 0 ) 
cO4O = a8O.(b66 0 b l 2 7 ) 
c041 = a82 • (b54 0 b92) 
c042 = a 8 4 » ( b 8 7 e b l 6 ) 
c043 = a 8 6 * ( b l i e b 2 8 ) 
c044 = a88 • (bl51 ebl7) 
c045 = a90 • (b87 0 b97) 
c046 = a 9 2 * ( b l 2 3 e b 3 l ) 
c047 = a94 • (b58 ㊉ b7) 
c048 = a96 • (b l l8 ㊉ M20) 
cO49 = a 9 8 _ ( b l l 8 0 b 4 4 ) 
c050 = a l 0 0 . ( b 6 2 e b l 2 9 ) 
c051 = a l02 ^0392 ㊉ bl39) 
c052 = a l04 • (b97 ㊉ bl60) 
c053 = a l 0 6 » ( b 7 1 � bl30) 
c054 = a l 0 8 * ( b 5 9 e b l 3 8 ) 
c055 = a l l 0 * ( b l 2 9 e b 4 7 ) 
c056 = a l l 2 * ( b 4 e b 2 2 ) 
c057 = a l l 4 » ( b 9 4 ㊉ b l l 7 ) 
cO58 = a l l 6 . ( b 7 3 0 b 4 6 ) 
c059 = a l l 8 » ( b 9 5 e b 4 2 ) 
c060 = a l 2 0 - ( b l l 7 e b 2 7 ) 
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c061 = a l 2 2 » ( b 7 6 e b 3 6 ) 
c062 = a l 2 4 . ( b l 5 4 e b l 6 3 ) 
c063 = a l 2 6 « ( b 7 1 � bl9) 
c064 = a l 2 8 * ( b l 4 6 e b l 6 2 ) 
cO65 = al3O«(b9 0 b 4 6 ) 
c066 = a l 3 2 « ( b l 0 i e b 3 ) 
c067 = a l 3 4 * ( b l 0 6 ㊉ b56) 
c068 = a l36 • (b94 � b62) 
c069 = a l 3 8 . ( b l l 8 � bl40) 
c070 = a l 4 0 . ( b 8 2 � b l l 8 ) 
c071 = a l 4 2 _ ( b 9 8 � bl40) 
c072 = a l 4 4 . ( b l 2 0 e b 3 3 ) 
c073 = a l46 • (b64 ® b68) 
c 0 7 4 : a l 4 8 . ( b 8 0 e b l 2 9 ) 
c075 = a l 5 0 * ( b l 0 7 e b 4 l ) 
c076 = a l 5 2 * ( b 9 3 e b 6 0 ) 
c077 = a l 5 4 . ( b l 2 3 � bl30) 
c078 = a l 5 6 * ( b 8 3 ㊉ b89) 
c079 = a l 5 8 * ( b l 2 9 e b 7 5 ) 
c080 = a l60 • (bl68 ㊉ b20) 
c081 = a l 6 2 - ( b 5 e b 5 l ) 
c082 = a l 6 4 « ( b 9 i e b l 4 6 ) 
cO83 = a l 6 6 . ( b 8 7 0 b 2 7 ) 
c084 = a l68 • (bl03 0 bl38) 
c085 = a l 7 0 * ( b 4 8 e b 7 7 ) 
c086 = a l 7 2 “ b l l l ® b 3 9 ) 
c087 = a l * ( b l 2 7 © b 2 6 ) 
c088 = a 3 . ( b l 3 9 ㊉ bl68) 
c089 = a5 • (b24 ㊉ b59) 
c090 = a 7 # ( b l 2 4 e b l l ) 
c091 = a 9 » ( b l 8 e b 7 3 ) 
c092 = a l l * ( b l 0 8 e b l 5 4 ) 
c093 = a l 3 * ( b l 0 1 ㊉ bl26) 
c094 = a l 5 - ( b l i e b 6 5 ) 
c095 = a l 7 • (b22 ㊉ b28) 
cO96 = a l 9 . ( b 6 5 0 b 7 2 ) 
c097 = a 2 1 . ( b 5 e b 3 8 ) 
cO98 = a 2 3 * ( b l 6 2 0 b 5 5 ) 
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c099 = a 2 5 * ( b 3 1 © b 8 0 ) 
Cl00 = a 2 7 . ( b l 8 e b 2 2 ) 
Cl01 = a 2 9 « ( b l 6 3 e b 7 7 ) 
c l 0 2 = a 3 1 * ( b 5 8 e b l 0 0 ) 
C l 0 3 = a 3 3 . ( b 4 5 e b 8 1 ) 
c l 0 4 = a 3 5 « ( b l 0 6 e b 8 4 ) 
Cl05 = a 3 7 * ( b 3 i e b 6 3 ) 
c l 0 6 = a 3 9 . ( b 2 8 ㊉ b78) 
C l 0 7 = a 4 1 . ( b l 5 i e b 7 6 ) 
Cl08 = a43_(bl60 ㊉ b24) 
c l 0 9 = a 4 5 * ( b l 2 7 ㊉ b l 4 3 ) 
C l l 0 = a 4 7 » ( b 3 © b 5 5 ) 
c l l l = a 4 9 * ( b l 4 1 ㊉ b l 5 0 ) 
C l l 2 = a 5 1 • ( b 2 6 �b 6 6 ) 
C l l 3 = a 5 3 . ( b 2 0 e b l l 0 ) 
C l l 4 = a 5 5 * ( b 3 8 e b 9 l ) 
C l l 5 = a 5 7 » ( b 4 5 © b 7 2 ) 
C l l 6 = a 5 9 * ( b l l 9 e b 9 6 ) 
C l l 7 = a 6 1 » ( b 9 e b 2 7 ) 
c l l 8 = a 6 3 * ( b l 3 7 e b 5 5 ) 
C l l 9 = a 6 5 * ( b l 4 9 e b 7 0 ) 
c l 2 0 = a 6 7 » ( b l 4 4 e b 8 5 ) 
c l 2 1 = a 6 9 * ( b 4 e b l l 4 ) 
C l 2 2 = a 7 1 * ( b l 5 9 ㊉ b l l 2 ) 
c l 2 3 = a 7 3 * ( b l 5 2 e b 8 5 ) 
Cl24 = a 7 5 * ( b l 4 4 e b 7 0 ) 
Cl25 = a 7 7 * ( b l 4 7 e b l 4 9 ) 
c l 2 6 = a 7 9 * ( b 3 9 ㊉ b90) 
Cl27 = a 8 1 » ( b l 5 8 e b 6 6 ) 
Cl28 = a 8 3 » ( b l 3 5 e b l 2 5 ) 
C l 2 9 = a 8 5 - ( b l 9 e b 5 8 ) 
Cl30 = a 8 7 . ( b 5 5 ® b 7 2 ) 
Cl31 = a 8 9 * ( b l 3 4 e b 6 3 ) 
c l 3 2 = a91 • ( b l 4 2 0 b l O 4 ) 
Cl33 = a 9 3 » ( b 7 e b l l 9 ) 
Cl34 = a 9 5 * ( b l 6 2 e b 3 3 ) 
C l 3 5 = a 9 7 . ( b 8 5 e b l 2 6 ) 
c l36 = a 9 9 * ( b l 5 6 e b 4 8 ) 
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c l 3 7 = a l 0 1 • ( b l 6 0 e b 9 0 ) 
c l 3 8 = a l O 3 . ( b l 6 9 0 b 8 5 ) 
Cl39 = a l 0 5 * ( b 2 2 e b 4 l ) 
Cl40 = al07*(b27ebl24) 
c l 4 1 = a l 0 9 * ( b l l ® b l l 6 ) 
c l 4 2 = a l l l * ( b 6 5 e b 7 6 ) 
Cl43 = a l l 3 » ( b 5 i e b 5 9 ) 
Cl44 = all5*(bl53eb65) 
Cl45 = all7*(b78ebl04) 
c l 4 6 = a l l 9 * ( b l 7 e b l 3 2 ) 
cl47 = al21 •(bl6iebl6) 
Cl48 = al23*(b36ebll6) 
Cl49 = a l 2 5 * ( b 7 2 e b 7 7 ) 
cl50 = al27*(b91 ㊉ bl48) 
cl51 = al29 •0)81 ㊉ bl50) 
Cl52 = al31«(bl53ebl54) 
c l 5 3 = a l 3 3 . ( b 8 4 e b 9 6 ) 
cl54 = al35«(b46 ㊉ b80) 
Cl55 = a l 3 7 * ( b l 7 e b 7 3 ) 
Cl56 = al39.(bl72©b42) 
cl57 = al41*(b60 ① bl24) 
Cl58 = a l 4 3 » ( b 2 8 e b 3 l ) 
Cl59 = al45*(bll9©bl32) 
c l60 = a l 4 7 * ( b i e b l 5 ) 
c l 6 1 = a l 4 9 * ( b 2 6 e b 4 6 ) 
c l 6 2 = a l 5 1 * ( b 2 5 e b 5 6 ) 
c l 6 3 = a l 5 3 « ( b l l 2 e b l 5 7 ) 
c l 6 4 = a l 5 5 « ( b 6 4 e b l 2 6 ) 
Cl65 = a l 5 7 - ( b 4 7 e b 7 7 ) 
Cl66 = a l 5 9 * ( b l 8 e b l l 4 ) 
Cl67 = al61*(b62ebl57) 
cl68 = al63 • (b44 0 b68) 
Cl69 = a l 6 5 * ( b 2 e b 7 5 ) 
cl70 = al67«(bll0ebl25) 
Cl71 = al69*(bl00ebl48) 
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Schematics of the System Level Design 
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